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UNITED STATES V. SAHHAR: THE RIGHT TO A JURY
DETERMINATION OF INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
JOHN GEORGE SAHHAR was indicted in September 1987 for
making a threat against the President of the United States. Sah-
har was found incompetent to stand trial in November 1987 and
was again found incompetent in July 1988. Upon a motion by the
acting warden of the federal correctional facility in which he had
been held, Sahhar was involuntarily committed in October 1988.
This placement could be permanent. Sahhar appealed his commit-
ment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In United States v. Sahhar,1 a three judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit considered Sahhar's equal protection and due process ob-
jections. The panel held that the federal statute2 permitting the
indefinite commitment, without a jury trial, of a defendant found
incompetent to stand trial does not violate the Constitution.
Sahhar is worthy of study for a number of reasons. The case
is one of a number exploring the relevance of criminal procedural
safeguards to noncriminal settings in which the liberty interest of
the defendant is at risk. The court's holding is another in the line
of cases that limit the procedural safeguards extended to criminal
defendants. Finally, this case is noteworthy for the lessons in
equal protection analysis taught by the divergent approaches of
the majority and dissenting opinions.
I. BACKGROUND
Sahhar challenged his involuntary commitment on three
grounds. He first asserted that the federal statute providing for his
commitment "denie[d] him equal protection by creating a differ-
ent standard for commitment for those charged with federal
crimes than for the general population." 3 Second, he charged that
his commitment, in the absence of a jury trial, violated his fifth
and sixth amendment rights. Last, he claimed that due process
required the court to make a finding that he had recently commit-
1. 947 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1990).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (1988).
3. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1200.
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ted dangerous acts before he could be committed.
A. Equal Protection
Sahhar's involuntary commitment raises equal protection is-
sues because the statute under which he was committed creates a
procedure for the commitment of a category of persons, those ac-
cused of federal crimes, leaving all others subject to the civil com-
mitment law of the individual states. The first step in any equal
protection analysis is the determination of the appropriate stan-
dard of review. Sahhar argued that since commitment represents
"'a significant deprivation of liberty,' " a heightened level of
scrutiny should apply.5 A brief review of the relevant case law,
however, demonstrates that the Supreme Court has been reluctant
to establish a definite standard for commitment procedures.
Jackson v. Indiana," concerning the involuntary commitment
of a defendant found incompetent to stand trial, is the Supreme
Court case most nearly on point with Sahhar. Indiana law pro-
vided for the pretrial commitment of those found incompetent to
stand trial. Jackson, a retarded deaf mute accused of two robber-
ies totaling cash in the amount of nine dollars, was "committed to
the Indiana Department of Health until such time as that Depart-
ment should certify to the court that 'the defendant is sane.' "
Indiana law provided for three separate involuntary commitment
procedures: one for criminal defendants found incompetent, an-
other for the "feeble-minded," and a third for those found men-
tally ill.8 Jackson's commitment was all but formally permanent.9
The Court compared the ease with which the state could win com-
mitment and the difficulty with which Jackson could win release
to the requirements under the other two procedures. The disparity
was so significant that the Court found a violation of Jackson's
equal protection rights. Despite the Court's elaborate analysis,
however, it failed to state the standard by which it rendered its
comparison.
The Court has also refused to articulate a standard for review
4. Id. at 1201 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).
5. Id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 n.* (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
6. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
7. Id. at 719.
8. Id. at 720-23.
9. Id. at 729 (while the court indicated that Jackson could be released when he be-
came competent, experts testified that Jackson likely would never become competent).
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of the commitment process for defendants at other stages in the
criminal justice system. Baxstrom v. Herold"° concerned a New'
York statute permitting the commitment of inmates at the com-
pletion of their jail sentences. Such persons could be committed to
mental institutions "[w]ithout the jury review available to all
other persons civilly committed in New York."" Striking down
the statute, the Court held that the
[c]lassification of mentally ill persons as either [criminally in-
sane or 'civilly insane'] . . . may be a reasonable distinction for
purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care to
be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the
opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all.12
Again, the Court was not explicit about the standard of review.
In Jones v. United States,l the Supreme Court considered
the commitment of a District of Columbia criminal defendant
found not guilty by reason of insanity. Such a person was held to
be entitled to a judicial hearing on commitment within fifty days
of the not guilty verdict. The defendant bore the burden of show-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not then suffer
from a mental illness. He was not entitled to a jury determination
of the issue. But the civil commitment process in the District of
Columbia required that the state bear the burden of proving, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant was mentally ill
and dangerous. Further, the defendant in the civil process was en-
titled to demand a jury.' 4
The Court found the distinction did not violate the criminal
defendant's equal protection rights. It held that the jury's determi-
nation of insanity at the criminal trial, combined with the "com-
mon sense [conclusion] that someone whose mental illness was
sufficient to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain
ill and in need of treatment,"' 5 justify the unequal treatment. Al-
though the Court did not specifically state the level of analysis it
applied, by implication it accepted the reasoning of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals' decision,' 6 which used a rational ba-
sis standard of review.
10. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
1. Id. at 110.
12. Id. at 111 (emphasis in original).
13. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
14. Id. at 356-59.
15. Id. at 366.
16. See Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981).
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In sum, the Court has never expressly stated the level of scru-
tiny it will apply to the equal protection analysis of procedures for
the commitment of criminal defendants and not guilty by reason
of insanity acquittees. The language it uses, however, seems to be
that of rational basis analysis.17
B. Right to a Jury Determination
Sahhar's second claim was that without the right to demand
a jury, the federal commitment process is unconstitutional. He as-
serted that this right might derive from guarantees found in either
the fifth or the sixth amendment.
The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an
impartial jury.""8 The Court has never considered the specific
question of whether a pretrial commitment proceeding is criminal
for purposes of the sixth amendment's right to trial by jury. How-
ever, in Allen v. Illinois"9 it considered whether the fifth amend-
ment's guarantee against self-incrimination in criminal cases ap-
plied in a commitment proceeding.
The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act permitted the
commitment of those found to be suffering from a mental disorder
presently and for more than one year and had demonstrable
propensities to commit sex offenses. 20 Allen was committed under
the statute on the basis of testimony by psychiatrists who ex-
amined him. He claimed a fifth amendment violation. The Court
held that fifth amendment self-incrimination rights did not attach
to this civil proceeding. The civil nature of the commitment was
established by consideration of the state interests it furthered. The
statute did not "promote either of 'the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence.' "21 Instead, the state's interest
was to provide "care and treatment."2 The nonpunitive nature of
its interests was exemplified in the provision for the release at
such a time that the "patient is found to be no longer danger-
17. In Baxstrom and Jones, the Court searched for a legitimate state interest and
then looked to see if the discrimination practiced was rationally related to achieving that
legitimate state interest. Such a test has traditionally been referred to as the rational basis
standard. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1982).
18. U.S. Co NsT. amend. VI.
19. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
20. Id. at 366 n.l.
21. Id. at 370 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
22. Id. at 369.
1032 [Vol. 41:1029
UNITED STATES v. SAHHAR
ous."2 3 Since the proceeding was not a criminal prosecution as re-
quired by the sixth amendment, its terms were held not to apply.
Sahhar also claimed that the fifth amendment due process
guarantee 4 requires that a commitment proceeding be held before
a jury, even though the proceeding is civil in nature.2 5 The general
approach for testing whether a particular procedure is a necessary
part of due process was set out in Mathews v. Eldridge.26 Accord-
ing to Mathews, the court is required to balance a number of
factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.27
The Ninth Circuit had occasion to review the Mathews
weighing of due process procedures as they apply to commitment
proceedings in Tyars v. Finner.28 The Tyars court found that the
essential question is whether the committed party has been af-
forded "fundamental fairness,' 29 not whether a certain procedural
protection must be transferred from the criminal to the civil set-
ting. The Tyars court was influenced by the line of Supreme
Court cases beginning with Addington v. Texas.30 Addington rec-
ognized that while "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes
a significant deprivation of liberty," 31 the Constitution does not
require that all criminal procedure protections be extended to de-
fendants in commitment proceedings.32 The language of Tyars,
quoted in Sahhar, summarized the state of the law:
In weighing the liberty interest of the individual against the le-
23. Id.
24. "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
25. United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 1990).
26. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
27. Id. at 335.
28. 709 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 1283.
30. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
31. Id. at 425, quoted in Tyars, 709 F.2d at 1282.
32. Addington held that a clear and convincing standard of proof, rather than the
criminal requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, was sufficient to protect the de-
fendant in a commitment proceeding Addington, 441 U.S. at 431.
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gitimate interests and purposes of the state in the civil commit-
ment process, it is vital that, as a matter of constitutional due
process, we impose. those restrictions that are 'imperative to as-
sure the proceedings' fundamental fairness.' However, we must
also strive to 'preserve, so far as possible, the essential elements
of the State's purpose,' and that we measure the requirements of
due process with a sensitive awareness of the need to 'permit the
orderly selection of any additional protections which may ulti-
mately prove necessary. 33
The Tyars court approved of the "flexibility of the fundamental
fairness requirement,"34 which does not require "any automatic
congruence between the procedural due process requirements in
criminal trials, juvenile proceedings and involuntary civil
commitments. 3 5
C. Due Process and Recent Dangerous Acts
Lastly, Sahhar claimed that "due process and section 4246
• . .require the government to prove that he had recently com-
mitted overt acts evincing his dangerousness." ' 6 The statute itself
includes no explicit requirement that recent acts justify the finding
of substantial risk.
In Addington v. Texas,a7 the Court reviewed the due process
requirements for civil commitment proceedings. The Court held
that a clear and convincing standard of proof, rather than a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard, is required to make the risk
of an erroneous commitment less likely. This risk was of concern
because a court might commit a person "based solely on a few
isolated instances of unusual conduct." 38 The Court intended to
guard against commitment based merely on "idiosyncratic behav-
ior."'3 9 No mention of the relative recency of the unusual behavior
was made in Addington. Because only the standard of proof was
33. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1206 (quoting Tyars, 709 F.2d at 1283, and In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 72 (1967)). The Tyars opinion found that shackling Tyars during his testi-
mony, absent any demonstration of his disruptive behavior in court, was a due process
violation. The opinion therefore avoided the subject of Tyars's habeas corpus petition, his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The court nonetheless offered lengthy
dicta on the fundamental fairness test.
34. Tyars, 709 F.2d at 1283.
35. Id.
36. United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir. 1990).
37. 441 U.S. 418 (1979); see supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
38. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
39. Id.
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at issue,40 the Court's review of civil commitment due process re-
quirements in Addington does'not dispose of the recency issue.
II. United States v. Sahhar
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Judge Kozinski, began with
a summary of the facts and procedural history of the case. John
George Sahhar was indicted on September 18, 1987, "for making
a threat against the President of the United States."' Prior to
trial, the government requested a competency hearing, resulting in
a November 1987 finding that Sahhar was not competent to stand
trial.42 At a second competency hearing, held on July 29, 1988,
the court found that Sahhar was still incompetent to stand trial. 43
"Soon thereafter," the acting warden at Terminal Island
prison filed a certificate requesting an involuntary commitment
hearing.44 At the hearing on October 13, 1988, "the court found
that Sahhar . . suffer[ed] from a mental disease or defect and
that his release would present a substantial risk of harm."' 45 He
was committed to the custody of the Attorney General who was
asked to seek an appropriate state placement for Sahhar. In addi-
tion, the court required a report every six months on Sahhar's
condition.
The court then summarized the commitment procedures set
out by federal statute.46 These procedures apply to federal crimi-
nal defendants and to no other population. The statute provides
for an initial hearing on competency4 that may be initiated by
40. Id. at 419-20.
41. United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir. 1990).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (1988) (The court will not proceed against a person
"presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to
the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him or to assist properly in his defense.").
43. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1199. A psychiatrist from the Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, Dr. Donald R. Britts, testified that Sahhar was a "para-
noid schizophrenic . . . and was not competent to stand trial and unlikely to become so
within a reasonable period of time." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1200. Dr. Jeanne Hetzel, Chief of Psychology Services at Terminal Island
testified that Sahhar was psychotic. Further, she found that he "[p]resented a substantial
risk to other people" basing that opinion on both general tendencies and specific instances
of violent behavior she observed while Sahhar was at the facility. Id. at 1199.
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (1988).
47. Id. § 4241.
10351991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
either party or the court acting sua sponte.4 8 A defendant found
incompetent may be committed to the custody of the Attorney
General for "a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four
months." '49 This temporary commitment is for the purpose of as-
sessing whether there is a "substantial probability" the defendant
will become competent to stand trial "in the foreseeable future. ' 50
The four month period may be extended "for an additional rea-
sonable period of time,"51 but a defendant who has not become
competent within that time is subject to section 4246.
Section 4246 provides the procedures by which federal pris-
oners committed to the care of the Attorney General under sec-
tion 4241(d), but due to be released, may be committed for a fur-
ther, indefinite period of time. The process is initiated by the
director of the facility in which the defendant is being housed.
The director first certifies to the court that the prisoner "is pres-
ently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of
which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury
to another person or serious damage to property of another, and
that suitable arrangements for state custody and care of the per-
son are not available."52 The court must then order a hearing to
determine the validity of the director's certificate. If the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the director's certifi-
cate is accurate, the defendant is committed to the custody of the
Attorney General. The Attorney General is then to release the
person to the custody of the appropriate state official, provided
that the state will "assume responsibility for [the defendant's]
custody, care, and treatment. 53 If the state will not assume this
responsibility, the United States Attorney General is empowered
to hospitalize the prisoner until the state assumes responsibility
for the prisoner or the prisoner's mental condition becomes such
that there is no longer a risk of harm to persons or property. 54
A procedure for the release of prisoners hospitalized under
section 4246, very much like that which governs their hospitaliza-
tion, is set out in section 4246(e). The director of the facility at
which the defendant is hospitalized must certify to the court that
48. Id. § 4241(a).
49. Id. § 4241(d)(I).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 4241(d)(2).
52. Id. § 4246(a).
53. Id. § 4246(d).
54. Id. § 4246(d)(1)-(2).
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"the person has recovered from his mental disease or defect to
such an extent that his release would no longer create a substan-
tial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to
[the] property of another."55 The court may then either order the
release of the defendant, order a hearing on the release, or be re-
quired to order a hearing by motion of the attorney for the gov-
ernment. If it is established by a preponderance of the evidence
that "the person has recovered from his mental disease or defect
to such an extent that" he would no longer pose a substantial
threat of bodily injury or of serious damage to property, the court
must order his release or conditional release.56 After its lengthy
but necessary review of the statute, the court began its analysis
with Sahhar's equal protection claim. It first raised the question of
the appropriate standard of review. The court cited dicta sug-
gesting that the rational basis standard would apply and then
noted Sahhar's contention that the intermediate scrutiny standard,
announced in Craig v. Boren,5 7 should apply. The majority con-
cluded that it would come to the same result no matter which
standard were applied. It therefore left the question unanswered
but applied the intermediate scrutiny analysis in considering Sah-
har's claim.
The majority next considered the government interest fur-
thered by the classification in question. It found "[tihe govern-
ment's interest in protecting society from those charged with
crimes [to be] both 'legitimate and compelling.' -58 Sahhar's argu-
ment that this interest does not permit Congress to "establish pro-
cedures that make it easier to commit those charged with crimes
than to commit members of the general population" was
rejected.5 9
The majority's rejection of Sahhar's claim began with a cita-
tion to the cases he raised in its support, chiefly Baxstrom v. He-
rold and Jackson v. Indiana.61 After admitting that "Jackson
and Baxstrom do provide some support for Sahhar's position," the
court concluded that "other cases teach that not every disparity
55. Id. § 4246(c).
56. Id. § 4246(e)(2)(A)-(B).
57. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
58. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1201 (quoting United States v. Solerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749
(1987)).
59. Id. at 1201.
60. 383 U.S. 107 (1966); see supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
61. 406 U.S. 715 (1972); see supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
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between commitment procedures applicable to individuals accused
of crimes and those applicable to the general population amounts
to a denial of equal protection." '62 Houghton v. South, 3 in which
the Ninth Circuit upheld a Montana statute establishing different
standards for the commitment of criminal defendants and for the
general population, and Jones v. United States64 are given as ex-
amples. The court then held that "the classification created by
section 4246 [is] substantially related to important federal con-
cerns." 5 These concerns are "the protect[ion of] society from
dangerous criminal defendants ... [and] the control and treat-
ment of dangerous persons within the federal criminal justice sys-
tem who are incompetent to stand trial."66 Section 4246 was held
to be "narrowly tailored" to achieve these goals because it applies
to the discrete category of "dangerous persons charged with fed-
eral crimes but found incompetent to stand trial."
6 7
The court then defended the distinction between the category
of persons reached by section 4246 and the general population.
The government is not required to establish a procedure for the
involuntary commitment of members of the general population.
That would represent "a massive federal intrusion into a field that
has generally belonged to the states."' 68 The court noted the simi-
larities between commitment procedures established by the states
and the federal procedure set out in sections 4241-4247, empha-
sizing the protections offered to the committee .6  Finally, the
court acknowledged the liberty interest at stake in a commitment
hearing, but upheld the government's decision not to subject the
general population to such proceedings. It concluded therefore
that section 4246 does not violate the equal protection clause.70
The court then considered Sahhar's claim to a right to a jury
determination. It rejected Sahhar's contention that the commit-
ment proceedings of those charged with federal crimes are "in the
62. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1202.
63. 743 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1984).
64. 463 U.S. 354 (1983); see supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
65. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1203.
66. Id. (citation omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The court noted that committees are guaranteed a full evidentiary hearing, an
attorney, and the right to testify, to present evidence, and to subpoena their own witnesses
and cross-examine those for the government. Id. at 1204.
70. Id.
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routine of the criminal process" 71 and thus entitled to sixth
amendment constitutional procedural protections.7  The court
cited Allen v. Illinois,73 where the Supreme Court held that Illi-
nois's commitment proceedings under that state's Sexually Dan-
gerous Persons Act were regulatory, not punitive, in nature. 4 The
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was held not to
apply to such proceedings.
The proceedings established by sections 4241-4247 were held
to be regulatory as well. "Section 4246 is not intended to address
""75past wrongs, but rather to reduce the risk of future harm ....
The procedure assures that the committee shall be released upon
recovery, a key indication that the procedure is not punitive. Since
the procedure is not criminal in nature, the sixth amendment is
held not to apply to those proceedings.
Sahhar also argued that the fifth amendment's due process
clause required a jury determination of his commitment. The
court set out the weighing test they referred to as "the fundamen-
tal fairness requirement.""T6 While the liberty interest of the indi-
vidual is admittedly a strong one, the Supreme Court has held
that the right to a jury trial "is neither a necessary element of the
fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due process clause, nor an
essential component of accurate factfinding." 77 Since Sahhar
failed to convince the court that the lay judgment a jury in-
troduces would increase the proceeding's reliability or fairness, his
claim for fifth amendment protection was also rejected.
Finally, the majority considered Sahhar's claim that a com-
mitment would comport with due process only if it were proved
that "he had recently committed overt acts evincing his danger-
ousness.""78 The court disposed of this claim by first reviewing the
statute, which provides that commitment be ordered if it is proved
that the defendant presents a "substantial risk of bodily injury
• . . or serious damage to property.""79 The majority held that the
71. LId.
72. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by
an impartial jury." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
73. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
74. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
75. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1205.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
77. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1207 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543
(1971) (trial by jury not guaranteed in a juvenile delinquency proceeding)).
78. Id. at 1207.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) (1988).
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recency of the activity on which this finding was based repre-
sented "but one factor . . . to [be] consider[ed] in weighing the
evidence" to determine if the requirements of the statute have
been met.80 The court next ,considered the fifth amendment due
process clause as a possible source of the jury requirement. The
court concluded that as long as the commitment was based on
more than idiosyncratic behavior it would comport with due pro-
cess. This standard is derived from Addington v. Texas,81 where
the Court's due process analysis of commitment proceedings did
not require a jury determination.
A summary consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence to
meet the clear and convincing standard completed the majority
opinion. The court concluded that the district court's decision was
"supported by substantial evidence."82
B. The Dissent
Judge Nelson's dissent agreed with the holding that there is
no sixth amendment right to a jury in the federal prisoner com-
mitment setting but concluded that Sahhar was denied equal pro-
tection. The dissent began by addressing the question of the level
of scrutiny to be applied to the classification. Judge Nelson agreed
with the majority that the Supreme Court has never explicitly ad-
dressed the question. Where the majority found dicta indicating
the rational basis test would apply,83 however, Judge Nelson
pointed to a Ninth Circuit decision suggesting that intermediate
scrutiny should apply. In Hickey v. Morris,84 the Ninth Circuit
stated that "[i]n Jackson, Humphrey, and Baxstrom, the Court
used rational basis language but invalidated the classification.
This suggests that it applies the intermediate scrutiny test to clas-
sifications affecting involuntary commitment.18 5 Judge Nelson's
own consideration of the matter concluded that "the rational basis
test . . . would be totally inappropriate . . . in light of the threat
to individual liberty" created by the statute in question.88 She
therefore chose to apply intermediate scrutiny.
80. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1207.
81. 441 U.S. 418 (1979); see also supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
82. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1208.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 6-17.
84. 722 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1983).
85. Id. at 546.
86. United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1209 (9th Cir. 1990) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting).
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The dissent's analysis placed significant weight on the possi-
bility that a defendant coming under section 4246 could be com-
mitted for a lifetime with only "limited review" of the court's de-
termination. 7 Judge Nelson then noted 'that other criminal
defendants facing six months or more of imprisonment are guar-
anteed the right to a jury trial. The subclass of those who are
mentally ill, she claimed, are not.
Judge Nelson then reviewed the government interests ad-
vanced to justify the classification: "the protection of society...
and . . . the control and treatment of dangerous persons within
the federal justice system.""8 While acknowledging the impor-
tance of these interests, she denied that they are substantially re-
lated to the denial of a jury trial in commitment proceedings.
"Denying a criminal defendant the right to a jury determination
of dangerousness does not make our streets safer; it merely com-
promises the procedural integrity of the judicial system." 89 She
concluded that the statute violated Sahhar's equal protection
rights and was therefore unconstitutional.
III. ANALYSIS
The majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Sah-
har90 derive from two very different viewpoints. The majority
thought that the provisions of section 4246 provide reasonable
safeguards for society while respecting the rights of the accused;
the dissent saw them as the first step toward an involuntary life-
time commitment made without a jury. These viewpoints began to
diverge in their analysis of the classification established by the
statute and in their choice of classifications for comparison.
The majority began by dividing all people into two categories:
federal prisoners found incompetent to stand trial and all other
persons. The procedures established in section 4246 to govern the
involuntary civil commitment of those federal prisoners were then
compared to the procedures for civil commitment of all other per-
sons. Since there is no federal statute for the civil commitment of
members of the general population, the commitment procedures of
the states were substituted for the nonexistent federal law.
The dissent did not accept this comparison as relevant, al-
87. Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1210 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
90. 917 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1990).
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though neither opinion explicitly recognized the distinction. For
Judge Nelson, the relevant comparison was between federal pris-
oners found incompetent to stand trial and federal prisoners in
general. She then compared the procedures under which a state
may limit the liberty of each category. Her approach was to re-
quire some justification for permitting fewer rights to be guaran-
teed to the subclass than to the larger class out of which it was
carved.
The differing categories for comparison explain the conflict-
ing results. State statutes governing civil commitment of members
of the general population are not required to extend criminal pro-
cedural protections to that population. Thus, the majority rea-
soned that there is no requirement to do so for federal prisoners
such as Sahhar. The dissent's federal criminal population facing
trial does, of course, have a right to those protections. The dissent
therefore saw no reason to deny them to a federal criminal de-
fendant such as Sahhar.
On its face, the majority approach is the stronger one. The
lesson of Addington v. Texas9' is clear: not all criminal procedural
protections are required for defendants in civil commitment pro-
ceedings, even though the infringement of liberty may be great.
While Addington considered only the standard of proof required
in the civil commitment setting, the majority saw no reason to
distinguish Addington's holding in the context of the right to a
jury determination. Had Sahhar demonstrated that a jury deter-
mination in civil commitments was somehow more reliable or just,
the majority might have reconsidered its decision.
Wisely, the dissent did not challenge this line of reasoning
directly. Judge Nelson, along with the majority, agreed that pro-
cedural due process does not require a jury determination of a
civil commitment. The majority relied on the holding in McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania that a jury trial is not a necessary part of the
process due in a juvenile delinquency hearing for this
proposition. 2
But Judge Nelson rejected McKeiver's precedential value on
equal protection grounds. Whereas juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings may be distinguished from typical judicial proceedings on the
basis of their informality, the same rationale does not apply to
involuntary civil commitment proceedings. In Judge Nelson's
91. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
92. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971), cited in Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1207.
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view, the special government interest in creating "'an intimate,
informal protective proceeding' " for juveniles has no counter-
part in commitment proceedings. The goals advanced by the gov-
ernment in Sahhar could be achieved just as well with a jury de-
termination as without one, but the juvenile proceeding would lose
its special qualities were a jury required.
Judge Nelson's approach is better-reasoned. She is correct in
perceiving the classification established in section 4246 as one
carved out of the larger class of all federal defendants. It is not all
those in the general population who are presently suffering from a
mental disease and are dangerous that are reached by the statute.
Only those who have committed a federal crime and are incompe-
tent to stand trial are affected. Even the majority admit that
Jackson v. Indiana94 and Baxstrom v. Herold9 provide some sup-
port for Sahhar's argument.9"
The majority minimized the lessons of those cases by assert-
ing that Houghton v. South97 and Jones v. United States98 teach
that not all disparities between commitment procedures for the
general population and the criminal population are prohibited.
Houghton, a Ninth Circuit case, held that differences between the
commitment procedures for those accused of crimes and the gen-
eral population were not equal protection violations. 99 The opin-
ion, however, failed to mention how the procedures differed and is
therefore of uncertain precedential value. Jones is also distinguish-
able. There, the Court permitted commitment, without a jury de-
termination, of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity.
The Court, however, based its holding on the reasonableness of
using the jury's verdict at the criminal trial as the basis of a find-
ing of mental defect and dangerousness. 00 Defendants in Sahhar's
position have never been brought before a jury; their situation is
therefore distinguishable.
Even if the majority is correct and Houghton and Jones per-
mit some disparities, the fact remains that some disparities are
93. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1210 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971)).
94. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
95. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
96. Sahhar, 917 F.2d at 1202.
97. 743 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1984).
98. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
99. Houghton, 743 F.2d at 1439-40.
100. Jones, 463 U.S. at 363-66.
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prohibited. To determine which ones are permitted, an equal pro-
tection analysis is required. This must begin with the question of
the standard of review. The majority chose not to come to a con-
clusion on this question, but the dissent argued for the intermedi-
ate scrutiny standard. Judge Nelson is correct in concluding that a
rational basis test, virtually assuring the approval of the statute, is
too lenient a standard when a significant liberty interest is at
stake. The Hickey court's analysis of Supreme Court hints on the
question is also persuasive; 101 having invalidated statutes, it stands
to reason that the Court applied more than rational basis scrutiny.
Judge Nelson's analysis of the relation between the govern-
ment interests to be achieved and the classification in question is
more incisive than the majority's. The majority sought to justify
the federal interest, but that interest is not in question. Clearly,
the protection of society and the treatment of dangerous persons
suffering from mental diseases are important interests. It is the
connection between the procedure established by section 4246 and
those interests that is questionable. The majority can merely point
to state commitment procedures that are similar to the federal
scheme, lamely acknowledging that most states guarantee the de-
fendant a jury trial. The majority fails to show how section 4246's
denial of a jury determination is substantially related to those in-
terests. No claim is made that the denial of a jury determination
advances substantial government interests. In the absence of such
a claim, the dissent's argument that the defendant may not be
denied a jury is convincing.
The most troubling aspect of the dissent is that it glossed over
the distinction between the liberty interests at risk in criminal
prosecutions and in civil commitments. While either may end in
the loss of freedom, to equate them is to ignore differences in their
purpose and in their context. While these distinctions are not fatal
to the dissent's conclusion, their analysis is certainly in order.
In addition, the dissent (like the majority opinion) failed to
give adequate consideration to just what substantive value a jury
determination might have. Whether the jury's contribution is
merely symbolic, or lies in representing the community's view of
dangerousness, or lies in its reliability or justness might have been
101. Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1983).
1044 [Vol. 41:1029 '
1991] UNITED STATES v. SAHHAR 1045
explored. Both the majority opinion and the dissent have left the
true meaning of a jury determination for another day
DANIEL ANKER

